Abstract: Empirical evidence suggests that the instrument rule describing the interest rate setting behavior of the Federal Reserve is non-linear. This paper shows that optimal monetary policy under parameter uncertainty can motivate this pattern. If the central bank is uncertain about the slope of the Phillips curve and follows a min-max strategy to formulate policy, the interest rate reacts more strongly to inflation when inflation is further away from target. The reason is that the worst case the central bank takes into account is endogenous and depends on the inflation rate and the output gap. When inflation increases, the worst-case perception of the Phillips curve slope becomes larger, thus requiring a stronger interest rate adjustment. Empirical evidence supports this form of non-linearity for post-1982 U.S. data.
Introduction
The interest rate setting behavior of central banks is routinely described by estimated interest rate rules. In the baseline specification going back to Taylor (1993) , for example, the policy instrument, i.e. the short-term interest rate, is linearly related to contemporaneous inflation and the output gap. These estimated rules perform remarkably well in replicating post-1982 Federal Reserve policy. 2 From a theoretical point of view, non-linearity in the policy rule can be motivated in three different ways. First, the underlying aggregate supply schedule might be nonlinear leading to a non-linear adjustment of the policy rate, see Nobay and Peel (2000) and Dolado et al. (2005) . Second, the preferences of the policymaker might not be quadratic in output and inflation. 3 Surico (2007) , among others, models asymmetric preferences in a standard New-Keynesian model. The resulting non-linear interest rate rule performs well in the pre-Volcker period but shows less signs of asymmetry in the post-Volcker era. Third, the policymaker might face uncertainty. Meyer et al. (2001) and Swanson (2006) show that non-linearities might stem from uncertainty about the natural rate of unemployment, formalized by a non-Gaussian prior distribution and a non-linear updating rule. As a result of the signal extraction problem, the central bank is more cautious about adjusting interest rates in response to small output gaps than in a standard Taylor rule but more aggressive when they reach a certain threshold. 4 2 See, among others, Clarida et al. (1998 Clarida et al. ( , 2000 , Judd and Rudebusch (1998) This paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the model and solves for optimal min-max policy under uncertainty. Section three studies the properties of the resulting non-linear instrument rule and section four provides empirical support for the form of non-linearity analyzed here. Section five draws some conclusions.
of non-linearity, see Meyer (2000) . 5 See Giannoni (2002), Rudebusch (2001) , and Söderström (2002) for an analysis of monetary policy rules under parameter uncertainty. 6 The special attention policymakers pay to the worst-case outcome is supported by narrative evidence, see Greenspan (2004) or recently Mishkin (2008).
Optimal policy rules under uncertainty
The section outlines the role of parameter uncertainty and robust monetary policy in an otherwise standard New-Keynesian model.
The model
We employ the standard New Keynesian model as a laboratory, see e.g. Woodford (2003) for a complete derivation. The forward-looking Phillips curve (1) and the IS curve (2) represent log-linearised equilibrium conditions of a simple sticky-price general equilibrium model
where π t is the inflation rate, x t the output gap, i t the risk-free nominal interest rate The central bank is uncertain about the slope coefficient κ. 7 In particular, the policymaker knows that his reference valueκ might be subject to model distortions z to be explained below
The central banker also faces an i.i.d. control error ξ t with mean zero. Thus, policy is unable to use observations on inflation and the output gap to back out k.
Monetary policy is assumed to set the policy instrument, i.e. the short term interest rate, in order to minimize the welfare loss due to sticky-prices which is described in terms of inflation volatility, output gap volatility, and interest rate variance weighted by the parameters λ x , λ i > 0
where π * is the constant inflation target. In the absence of misspecifications z, minimizing (4) subject to the model in (1) and (2) would give a set of first-order conditions, from which the optimal policy response to shocks could be computed.
The task is to reformulate the central bank's optimization problem such that the resulting policy rule performs well even if the model deviates from the reference model.
We transform the minimization problem into a min-max problem. The central bank wants to minimize the maximum welfare loss due to model misspecifications by specifying an appropriate policy. To illustrate the problem, we introduce a fictitious second rational agent, the evil agent, whose only goal is to maximize the central bank's loss.
The evil agent chooses a model from the available set of alternative models and the central bank chooses its policy optimally. Hence, the equilibrium is the outcome of a two-person game. Note that the evil agent is a convenient metaphor for the planner's cautionary behavior. Let z denote the evil agent's control variable, i.e. the parameter misspecification. The only constraint imposed upon the fictitious evil agent is his budget constraint requiring
Hence, the parameter ω measures the amount of misspecification the evil agent has available. The standard rational expectations solution for optimal monetary policy corresponds to ω = 0, such that the evil agent's budget is empty.
The policy problem
Throughout the paper we assume that policy is unable to commit to the optimal inertial plan. Instead, policy is conducted under discretionary optimization. The policymaker
subject to (1), (2), and (3). The Lagrangian of the policy problem can be written as
where μ π t and μ x t denote the Lagrange multipliers associated to the inflation adjustment equation and the consumption Euler equation, respectively. The Lagrange parameter θ is inversely related to ω. Hence, the rational expectations case corresponds to θ → ∞. 8 8 In this case, the evil agent maximizes the welfare loss by choosing z = 0.
A lower θ means that the central bank designs a policy which is appropriate for a wider set of possible misspecifications. Therefore, a lower θ is equivalent to a higher degree of robustness. The central bank plays a Nash game against the evil agent, who wants to maximize the welfare loss. Optimization under discretion results in the following set of first-order conditions
Together with the second condition, the fourth condition states that z = (π t − π * )
The larger is the central bank's concern for robustness, i.e. the lower θ, the larger the model distortion. Likewise, the evil agent's choice of z positive depends on both the output gap and inflation. Hence, the worst case policy outcome against the central bank wishes to shield the economy is endogenous. Intuitively, model uncertainty matters most if inflation and output exhibit large deviations from their steady state values. 9 The first order conditions can be combined to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers
When the inflation rate is above target and κ is known, the central bank has to raise the interest rate to contract the economy. When the central bank fears κ to be misspecified, a higher inflation rate also affects the slope coefficient κ. So not only does the central bank face an increase in inflation, but also witnesses an increase in κ,
i.e. its instrument becomes less effective in dampening aggregate demand. As a result, the size of the interest rate adjustment depends non-linearly on the inflation rate.
The non-linear instrument rule
Equation (8), which links all three endogenous variables, can be solved for i t to obtain an expression that resembles a conventional Taylor rule augmented by a non-linear
The interest rate responds not only to the level of inflation and the output gap, but also to the product of the squared inflation deviation and the output gap. Note that the non-linear term disappears once we approach the rational expectations benchmark, i.e. θ → ∞. Suppose that the central bank observes an increase in inflation. Equation (10) shows that the interest rate response depends on the level of inflation and the output gap
The interest rate response grows in the inflation rate. The higher the level of inflation, the stronger (for a positive output gap) the central bank adjusts interest rates to fight an increase in inflation. 10 Furthermore, when the output gap is positive, the interest rate adjustment is stronger for positive inflation rates than for corresponding (in absolute terms) negative inflation rates. Hence, uncertainty not only introduces non-linearity, but also asymmetry into the optimal policy stance.
Likewise, the interest rate response to the output gap depends on the squared level of
If inflation is high, the interest rate is raised stronger to contract the economy than in a situation with moderate inflation. The precise interest rate step in this case depends on the parameterization.
To visualize the degree of non-linearity in the Taylor rule, we choose standard parameter values to calculate the coefficients. In order to derive the interest rate rule, a positive interest weight in the central bank's loss function is essential. We choose to set λ x = 0.25, which is a frequently used benchmark parameterization, and set the penalty on interest rate changes to λ i = 0.10. The rational expectations case corresponds to θ RE = ∞. We choose θ robust = 10 to illustrate the effect of uncertainty. We assume an inflation target of zero, i.e. π * = 0. The other parameters are set toκ = 0.10, β = 0.99, and σ = 1.80. The resulting interest rate response to inflation and output gap movements is depicted in figure (1) . The non-linear response to inflation is clearly evident. A robustness-concerned central bank tolerates small fluctuations of inflation around the target, but forcefully counteracts larger deviations from target. Hence, the model also rationalizes that central banks frequently announce a target zone, typically π * ± 1%, around their inflation target. Inflation is fought mildly inside the zone, but strongly once it leaves the target range. 11 The period loss function of the form L = (π t − π * ) 2 + λ x x 2 t + λ i i t 2 can be derived as an approximation to the households' utility function in the presence of transactions frictions that motivate a demand for money. Woodford (2003, p. 423-4) shows that the optimal weights λ x and λ i depend on the underlying model structure. In particular, they depend on κ perceived by the central bank
where Ω 1 , Ω 2 > 0 depend on the model parameters, including the interest rate semielasticity of money demand. This expression clearly shows the cross-equation restriction implied by the underlying theory. Any variation in κ should be reflected in variations of the weights λ x and λ i . 12 As a consequence, the misspecification z affects the weights the central bank attaches to conflicting objectives. If inflation increases, κ =κ+(π t − π * ) x t θ −1 also increases for a positive output gap leading to larger weights λ x and λ i . This dampens the degree of non-linearity in (9).
Empirical Evidence
Is the non-linear instrument rule derived above empirically supported? To answer this question, we rewrite (9) in a form that corresponds to the large literature on estimated
Taylor-type interest rate rules
whereī is a constant and φ i , φ π , φ x , and φ π 2 x are reduced form coefficients to be estimated. 13 In accordance to the large literature on estimated Taylor rules, we add the lagged interest rate to account for the high degree of inertia in the policy instrument. Again, the inflation target is set to zero. Let G t−1 denote a vector of instruments that are dated t and earlier and, thus, are orthogonal to the inflation forecast error. Imposing rational expectations defines the following orthogonality con-
is a function of the parameter vector Θ. In this context, the reduced form specification of the GMM estimation is given by
We estimate this equation using U.S. data for the period 1982:3-2006:4. The inflation rate is the annualized rate of change of the personal consumption expenditure deflator 12 See Walsh (2005) for a detailed analysis of the consequences of endogenous weights for optimal monetary policy. 13 Clarida et al. (1998 Clarida et al. ( , 2000 , Judd and Rudebusch (1998) are presented in table (1) . Most importantly, the non-linear term x t π 2 t enters positively in both periods and for both inflation series. 14 When the non-linear term enters the rule, however, the output gap coefficient is no longer significant. In line with the theory outlined above, the Fed has adjusted interest rate more aggressively the further inflation was away from steady state. The size of this non-linear response is lower in the post 1987 sample than in the sample that includes the aggressive disinflation post-1982.
Conclusions
This paper showed that optimal monetary policy under parameter uncertainty can motivate a non-linear interest rate rule that is supported by U.S. data. While the linearity of the Phillips curve and the quadratic nature of the loss function are retained, the nonlinearity of the policy rule solely stems from the assumption of a min-max approach to parameter uncertainty. The crucial idea is that if the policymaker tries to avoid particularly bad outcomes, i.e. if she sets policy according to a min-max strategy, the maximum harm is endogenous and depends on the size of the output gap and the inflation rate. As a result, the policy response to inflation becomes stronger, the higher the inflation rate and the larger the output gap. The resulting non-linear Taylor rule is supported by U.S. data from the post-1982 period. In contrast to the bulk of the literature, these results do not stem from non-linearity in the Phillips curve or non-quadratic central preferences.
Certainly, the nature of parameter uncertainty analyzed here is overly simplistic. Not only is the central bank uncertain about a key parameter, but also gains no information about this parameter even if the central bank repeatedly plays against the evil agent.
However, the basic principle appears to be relevant to interpret actual policy decisions.
14 Note that existing evidence, e.g. Dolado et al. (2004 Dolado et al. ( , 2005 , include the product of the levels of inflation and the output gap, i.e. πtxt, as a regressor. 
